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Over 250 respondents—graduate students in law and public policy—assessed the risks of 
climate change and valued climate-change mitigation policies.  Many aspects of their behavior 
were consistent with rational behavior.  For example, respondents successfully estimated 
distributions of temperature increases in Boston by 2100.  The median value of best estimates 
was 1-3 degrees Fahrenheit.   In addition, people with higher risk estimates, whether for 
temperature or related risks (e.g., hurricane intensities) offered more to avoid warming.  Median 
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid global warming was $0.50/gallon, and 3% of income.  And 
important scope tests (e.g., respondents paid more for bigger accomplishments) were passed.  
However, significant behavioral propensities also emerged.  For example, accessibility of neutral 
information on global warming boosted risk estimates.  Warming projections correlated with 
estimates  for unrelated risks, such as earthquakes and heart attacks.  The implied WTP for 
avoidance was much greater when asked as a percent of income than as a gas tax, a percent 
thinking bias.  Home team betting showed itself; individuals predicting a Bush victory predicted 
smaller temperature increases.   In the climate-change arena, behavioral decision tendencies are 
like a fun-house mirror: They magnify some estimates and shrink others, but the contours of 
rational decision remain recognizable. 1 
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1.  Introduction 
This study assesses people’s risk beliefs and policy attitudes about climate change.  In 
contrast to publicly available surveys in this area, which primarily ask whether respondents are 
worried about global warming, our study asks much more precise questions.
1  In particular, it 
asks people to make explicit assessments of distributions of temperature outcomes.  It then 
inquires how much they would pay for specific policy interventions that would achieve particular 
policy goals.  Uncertainty about the magnitude of climate change plays a key role in this study.   
For this exploratory survey, our sample had 257 adult respondents, 133 from Harvard 
Law School and 124 from the Kennedy School of Government.
2  The overall response rate to 
this internet-based survey was over 70%.  The survey was undertaken in October and November 
2004 and was closed the day before the 2004 presidential election, when the Bush-Kerry race 
was a toss up.  The indicator employed for climate change was the temperature increase in 
Boston.
3      
The results of the survey provide intriguing evidence about the respondents’ risk 
perceptions and attitudes toward policies to mitigate those risks.
4  Section 2 explores 
respondents’ climate change risk beliefs in considerable detail.  These risk beliefs are highly 
diffuse. The high level of scientific uncertainty is mirrored in people’s assessed distribution of 
possible global warming outcomes, as there is a substantial spread between the 5
th percentile and 
the 95
th percentile of their assessed temperature increase distributions. Respondents’ attitudes 
                                                 
1 For examples of surveys, see Dunlap, Gallup, and Gallup (1993), Israel and Levinson (2004). Kempton (1991, 
1997) provides an interesting critique of public opinion polls and explores more detailed questions regarding the 
perceived consequences of climate change. 
2 We restrict our sample for analysis to 255 respondents, as two respondents gave unrealistic outlier responses 
indicating a failure to attend to the survey task. This survey should be regarded as an experiment rather than a 
nationally representative sample. 
3 Boston was chosen because that is where the respondents lived, and it was probably easiest for them to think about.  
The authors well recognize that global warming will have variable effects across the globe, and by season. 
4 Mitigation policies would include measures such as a gas tax (discussed here) or carbon sequestration (not 
discussed).  There could also be policies that allow society to adapt to whatever change does occur, e.g., moving 
activity away from coastlines.   2 
 
toward policy remedies, discussed in Section 3, indicate a potentially substantial level of support 
for truly effective climate-change mitigation policies. The influence of scientific uncertainty, 
which in turn influences the diffuseness of risk beliefs, should bolster support for more 
aggressive policies if respondents exhibit the well known behavioral phenomenon called 
ambiguity aversion. We found that respondents predominantly view the current scientific 
uncertainty as a rationale for greater support of policy interventions rather than for a wait-and-
see approach.  Even though the United States has lagged behind many other countries in its 
political support for policies to address global warming, willingness to pay for climate-change 
mitigation policies in this survey was not significantly lower for the U.S. respondents than for 
the foreign respondents. 
The study emphasized the uncertainties involved with global climate change. Virtually all 
climate-change experts agree that there is substantial uncertainty, and even a single scientific 
study may recognize a great range of possible outcomes.
5  Virtually all commentators admit that 
their estimates of global climate movements over the 21st century are imprecise, and most would 
indicate that their views changed substantially in the past decade.
6  Further uncertainties arise 
because for any given temperature increase, there is also substantial disagreement about the 
economic and broader social consequences.  Differing sides in the policy debate have used this 
massive uncertainty as a rationale for aggressive policy action or policy inaction, depending in 
part on whether they interpret the uncertainty as posing a risk of dire consequences, or an 
opportunity to learn whether there is a real problem.
7  
The four goals of this study are to: 1. Examine how a group of relatively well informed 
individuals estimate the risks of climate change; 2. Assess how much these individuals would 
pay to avoid climate-change risks; 3. Identify significant biases in individuals’ responses to risk 
assessment and willingness-to-pay questions; and 4. Identify the role of uncertainty in affecting 
preferred policy choices.   
                                                 
5 Stainforth et al. (2005) employ a “grand ensemble” of simulations using a general circulation model to estimate 
uncertainties.  They find predicted climate change values from less than 3.6 to more than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.  
Estimates above 13.4 degrees Fahrenheit emerge from 4.2% of simulations.  
6 Daniel Schrag, climate-change expert, private communication, January 15, 2005. Some observers suggest that 
since estimates of risk have risen dramatically in recent years we should expect more upward revision.  But the logic 
does not follow.  Today’s best estimate should be the mean value that will apply a decade hence.  This is equivalent 
to the belief that a stock that has gone up recently in price is no more favorable going forward than one that has 
moved little. 
7 For reviews of the policy debate, see Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins (2003), Schelling (1997), and Stewart and Wiener 
(2003). 3 
 
In addressing all of these issues, we shall be attentive to a range of behavioral biases in 
decision making of the type made famous by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.
8 Many of 
our respondents’ attitudes toward climate change policies were in accord with rational decision 
theory; for example, people who perceive greater risks of climate change express greater support 
for policies to address the risks of global warming. However, we also found important behavioral 
anomalies, such as evidence for what we call the “correlated risks hypothesis”: people who fear 
climate change risks also fear other unrelated risks, such as the risk of heart attacks. 
We should also be clear about what we did not attempt.  We did not assess whether the 
respondents were well or poorly informed.  Nor did we assess what information had led to their 
views, or would lead them to change their views, their values, or their recommended policies. 
Part 2 reviews the evidence on how our respondents view climate-change risks.  Part 3 
assesses individuals’ willingness-to-pay to avoid climate change, often in the context of 
particular policies.  Part 4 discusses how well a range of behavioral hypotheses explains the 
responses we observed.   
 
2.  Perception of Climate Change Risks 
Temperature change survey  
Two different versions of the survey were administered.  An entire copy of one version of 
the survey is included as an Appendix.  The first version provided no background information 
pertaining to the risks of climate change but proceeded directly to questions about temperature 
change and policy interventions.  The second version of the survey, which was randomly given 
to half of the respondents, included a very general background description of climate change 
risks and policy:   
This survey deals with global climate change. Harvard researchers describe the 
source of global warming in the following manner: "The world’s climate reflects, 
among other things, the concentration of greenhouse gases (including human-
induced emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants) in the atmosphere. Like 
in a greenhouse, these gases allow the sun’s heat to reach the planet surface but 
trap energy reflected from the surface resulting in warmer temperatures. 
Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations increases the warming effect." 
 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is the major international treaty addressing the control 
of greenhouse gases. The Protocol has been ratified by all major nations save the 
                                                 
8 See, among the most important contributions, Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 4 
 
United States and Australia. Final ratification in Russia is expected shortly. The 
Clinton Administration, though signing the treaty, never brought it forward for 
ratification, and the Bush Administration announced that it would not do so. The 
principal rationales for the U.S. position are that: (1) the controls are ill 
conceived, and are too costly to the United States, and (2) that the developing 
nations, most importantly China and India, are not required to cut emissions. 
 
This background information was crafted to be factual but to convey no new information 
to respondents about the magnitude or consequences of climate change.  Thus, any differences in 
answers across the two scenarios could indicate whether increasing the accessibility of climate 
change issues within the survey would affect participants’ responses.
9  It could also promote 
different responses between U.S. citizens and noncitizens, given the U.S. stand alone position on 
this policy issue. 
To elicit the distribution of respondents’ risk perceptions, the survey elicited the 95
th 
percentile, the 5
th percentile, and the median of each respondent’s risk assessment in degrees 
Fahrenheit.
10  In each instance, all questions focused on the increase in temperature that the 
respondent expected to take place in Boston between the time of the survey and 2100.  The 
segment of the survey focusing on climate-change risk beliefs was as follows: 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
(All questions below about temperature employ degrees Fahrenheit as the 
measure.) 
Temperature Estimates for 2100. Global climate change has been at the forefront 
of many environmental debates. Much of the reason for the controversy is that 
scientists have not reached a consensus regarding the likely extent of climate 
change. The next three questions ask for your opinion regarding how much the 
temperature will rise, if at all, over the next century. In particular, we will ask you 
to estimate in degrees Fahrenheit how much temperature will rise between now 
and 2100 in Boston. 
 
Upper-bound estimate.  What is your upper-bound estimate of how much the 
temperature will rise?  Thus, you think that there is only one chance in 20 that the 
temperature increase could be more than this amount. Check one. 
                                                 
9 Baron et al (1990) surveyed college students on their willingness to take action on the greenhouse effect.  Two 
versions of the survey were used.  One gave only best estimates; the other emphasized close-to- symmetric 
uncertainties about these estimates.  Respondents reading the best estimates shifted toward the other side, e.g., 
nonactors became more willing to act.  Those reading the uncertainties version stuck with their original position.       
10 Scientists and Europeans tend to use Celsius scales.  Some respondents—used to working with degrees Celsius—
may have reported on the wrong scale despite the emphasis on Fahrenheit throughout the survey.  This would lead to 
lower estimates, since a 1 degree Fahrenheit change equals a 5/9 degree Celsius change.  We thank Jeffrey Bielicki 
for alerting us to this possibility. 5 
 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
Lower-bound estimate.  What is your lower-bound estimate of how much the 
temperature will rise?  Thus, you think that there is only one chance in 20 that the 
temperature increase could be more than this amount.  Check one. 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
Best estimate.  What is your best estimate of how much the temperature will rise?  
Thus, there is a 50-50 chance that the temperature increase could be above or 
below this amount.  Check one. 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
The survey then elicited the increase in temperature that respondents expected to take 
place in Boston between the time of the survey and the year 2024.  That question, which is 
Question 3 in the Appendix, served two functions.  First, it elicited views regarding near-term 
climate change risks as opposed to longer-term risks.  Second, it provided the first step of a 
scope test on climate change responses to see whether respondents would pay more to achieve a 
more inclusive concept.  The temperature increase between the time of the survey and 2100 
should be greater than the temperature increase between the time of the survey and 2024; a gas 
tax that could control climate change till the later date would be accomplishing more. 
The survey also included a variety of other background questions and belief questions, 
which will be discussed in this section below, and Section 3. 
 
Qualifications 
Before turning to our findings and analysis, we should issue some qualifications.  First, 
Harvard graduate students are far from representative of the general population as a whole.  For 
example, they are far richer on a lifetime income basis, better informed, younger, and more 6 
 
concerned with policy, all attributes that likely affected their assessments.  To extrapolate our 
results to the general population would be misguided.  Second, we chose not to inform our 
respondents about global warming; therefore, we can not predict how additional scientific and 
policy relevant information would affect their responses.  Third, we made no attempt to compare 
respondents’ attitudes toward global warming to their attitudes on other policy issues where 
consequences come significantly in the future, such as personal decisions on saving and smoking 
behavior, or societal decisions on the future of Medicare or long-run tradeoffs in dealing with 
terrorism.  Work in areas such as myopia and hyperbolic discounting show that individuals do 
not apply consistent, reasonable discount rates to future consequences.
11  Fourth, we follow 
traditional social scientific methodology and identify statistical significance for certain variables, 
though the equations include nonsignificant variables as well when there is a theoretical 
justification for doing so.
12 
 
Results for temperature increase estimates 
Table 1 shows respondents’ expected temperature increases.  The upper bound estimate 
had a mean value of 6.1 degrees Fahrenheit and a median value of 5 degrees Fahrenheit, with 40 
percent of respondents believing that the upper bound increase would be 3-7 degrees and 33 
percent of respondents believing that it would be 7-11 degrees.
13   
The lower bound estimate of the temperature increase had a mean value of 1.5 degrees 
Fahrenheit and a median value of 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit.  A substantial 60 percent of the sample 
believed that the lower bound of the temperature increase over the coming century would be less 
than one degree, and an additional third of the sample believed that the lower bound of the 
temperature increase would be 1-3 degrees.   
The final column of Table 1 shows the results for the best estimates of the risk.  The 
mean estimate of the temperature increase in Boston is 3.4 degrees, which is lower than but 
roughly consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimate of a 
                                                 
11 We thank a referee for highlighting this issue of lack of sound thinking about the future.  See work by Strotz 
(1955-56) and Laibson (1997). 
12 For example, if we ran a regression with 20 independent variables, and one proved significant at the 0.05 level, 
that would be of little interest, since such an outcome would be expected by chance.  All of our independent 
variables were selected in accordance with theory, and virtually all produced results in the right direction, which is 
reassuring in this regard. 
13 For purposes of calculating the mean value, the midpoints of temperature intervals were employed.  In addition, 
answers indicating a temperature increase of over 11 degrees were coded as a 13 degree increase.   7 
 
3.6-7.2 degree F. average increase for the world as a whole.
14  Almost half the sample believed 
that the best estimate was 1-3 degrees, which was the median estimate, with an additional third 
of the sample believing the temperature increase would be 3-7 degrees.  Our analysis of 
projected temperature increases will focus on best estimates. 
To explore the determinants of the risk beliefs, we undertook a series of regression 
analyses.  Those analyses considered a respondent’s best estimate of the increase in temperature 
to be a function of the respondent’s background characteristics and his or her beliefs about a 
number of risks.   
A hypothesis underlies the choice of each of our independent variables.  Each hypothesis 
is followed by its predicted sign. 
 
Demographic hypotheses   
a.  Male.  Some experiments and surveys suggest that men are more willing to take risks 
than females.
15  More directly relevant, males perceive environmental risks to be lower 
than do women, including the risks of climate change.
16 -- Negative coefficient. 
b.  U.S. citizen.  The United States is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the 
world.  Moreover, relative to other advanced nations, it has been much less supportive of 
international agreements.  The responses of the 68 percent of the sample that are U.S. 
citizens may reflect their nation’s policy stand. -- Negative coefficient. 
c.  Law student.  Both groups of students are more liberal than the general population.  
However, it is believed that the Kennedy School students are more liberal than Law 
School students. -- Negative coefficient. 
 
Behavioral decision hypotheses 
Home team betting is a term we employ to refer to the tendency of individuals to predict 
the outcome that they would like to happen. This phenomenon could be a product of a number of 
phenomena related to overoptimism or motivated reasoning that are discussed in the literature.  
                                                 
14 See IPCC, 2001.  Stainforth et al (2005), although reporting greater uncertainty than the IPCC, had most estimates 
clustering around the similar value of 6.1 degrees Fahrenheit. 
15 The meta-analysis by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) concluded that there was some evidence of gender 
differences in risk taking along some dimensions, such as physical skills, but that there were fewer differences for 
other areas, such as smoking. 8 
 
These phenomena are usually concerned with benefits to the decision maker (e.g., self image) 
from the bias, or to cognitive limitations, say due to selective memory or information processing 
difficulties. But other possibilities remain, such as herding or selective information revelation—
e.g., favorable information is more likely to be revealed—among  members of groups with 
particular preferences, e.g., Red Sox fans or Bush supporters. Given home team betting, those 
predicting a Bush victory are more likely to be Bush supporters. 
d.  Bush predictor.  These individuals should have lower risk beliefs, given Bush’s 
reluctant approach and Kerry’s more aggressive approach to climate change 
interventions. -- Negative coefficient. 
The regressions in Table 2 also include three variables pertaining to beliefs about risks that have 
no causal relationship with global warming.  These variables are included to test the correlated 
estimates hypothesis, which states: People who predict high values for some risks will predict 
high values for unrelated other risks.  This hypothesis predicts, for example, that individuals who 
think that mortality risks are high in one area are more likely to think they are high in another.
17  
In this study we hypothesize that unrelated high risk estimates will not simply predict climate-
change risk assessments, but will correlate with support for climate change policy 
interventions.
18   
The heart attack question asked respondents to assess how many out of a group of 100 
randomly chosen male Harvard students aged 24 would have a heart attack by age 65.  The 
second risk belief variable asks about the number of U.S. citizens whom the respondents 
believed would be killed in the next 12 months because of attacks by foreign terrorists on 
airplanes.  The final risk variable question asks how many dwelling units in the U.S. will be 
destroyed by earthquakes in the next 12 months.  We posit that there will be a positive 
correlation between estimates of these risks and the risks of climate change. Our three Correlated 
estimates hypotheses are: 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Using a scale from 1 (almost no health risk) to 4 (high health risk), Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994) found that the 
rating of the climate change risk was 3.0 for females and 2.7 for males. 
17 For documentation of such person-specific fixed effects, see Hakes and Viscusi (2004), who report regression 
estimates of risk beliefs for a series of mortality risks using a fixed effects regression model, i.e., they estimate a 
personal shift parameter for each individual. 
18 A referee, observing that time delay is a critical component of global warming risk, and that the risk is related to 
human action.  We concur with the referee’s suggestion that it would be intriguing to assess how respondents’ 
attitudes towards global warming relate to decisions like smoking or saving for retirement, which reflect personal 
discount rates; or societal decisions, such as policies towards the deficit or social security, which reflect individuals’ 
discount rates for long-term collective outcomes.   9 
 
e.  Heart attacks. -- Positive coefficient. 
f.  Terrorism. -- Positive coefficient. 
g.  Earthquakes. -- Positive coefficient. 
A control variable indicates whether the background paragraphs were included in a 
respondent’s survey, with a dummy of 1 if they were presented.  We expected these paragraphs, 
which provide no information about the magnitude of global warming risks, to increase the 
accessibility of the problem, and thereby increase risk estimates.  (Accessibility is a concept that 
includes salience, selective attention, and priming.
19)    Our accessibility hypothesis is:   
h.  Background paragraphs. -- Positive coefficient. 
Finally, we include an interaction term for U.S. citizens who also received the 
background paragraphs.  Our hypothesis is that this background information, which identifies the 
U.S. as the sole major nation not signing the Kyoto Protocol, should make national differences 
more salient, and thereby further increase the gap between U.S. citizens and noncitizens.
20  This 
leads to 
i.  U.S. citizen and Background paragraphs Interaction. -- Negative coefficient. 
 
Results for determinants of the estimates of temperature increase 
The first column of Table 2 presents the regression for the best estimate of the 
temperature increase by 2100.
21  All statistically significant explanatory variables have 
coefficients with the predicted sign.  Four are significant at the 0.05 level, and two at the 0.10 
level.  Most of our demographic variables are significant, indicating negative effects of being 
Male, a U.S. citizen, or a Bush predictor.  The positive heart attack coefficient provides moderate 
positive evidence for correlated estimates.  As hypothesized, background paragraphs boost risk 
beliefs, but their interaction with U.S. citizen is negative, sufficiently so that there is no net effect 
for U.S. citizens.  
                                                 
19 See Kahneman (2002). 
20 Some respondents may have been unaware of such differences.  Hence, nationalism or the pursuit of national 
interest could promote such differences as well. 
21 The regression estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4, and all other analyses in this paper, exclude two outliers on 
particular questions.  One respondent estimated 60,000 deaths annually to terrorist attacks on airplanes, and another 
respondent indicated a willingness to sacrifice 100 percent of personal income to combat climate change.  For the 
terrorism airplane death toll question, the second largest outlier was 500, or one-twelfth of the size of the largest 
estimate.  For the percentage of income willingness to pay question, the second highest value was 60 percent, and 
the third highest was 50 percent. 10 
 
We repeated these regressions for our upper and lower bound estimates.  In results not 
shown, all significant variables had the predicted signs for each of the two bounds.  As before, 
Male and U.S. citizen had significant negative effects.
22  In the upper bound estimates, 
background paragraphs lost significance, as did heart attacks.  However, Terrorism and 
Earthquake gained significance.  
An additional study, not reported, used upper and lower bound estimates as explanatory 
variables when predicting the best estimate.  Not surprisingly, both were exceedingly significant 
both statistically and in their predictive impact, with the lower bound estimate having the greater 
effect.
23   
A further unreported study about the shape of the distributions looked at individual 
surveys to see whether those who assessed high values for upper bounds assessed higher or 
lower values for lower bounds.  Either outcome has a plausible explanation.  The former would 
suggest that some individuals just had higher estimates (or similarly, lower estimates) than 
others.  The latter would indicate that some individuals had broader distributions than others.  A 
rank order correlation of high and low estimates yielded a Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
of 0.46, suggesting that the higher estimates explanation predominates. 
We then redid our best estimates analysis looking to the temperature change in Boston till 
2024.  This was intended partly as a scope test.  The test was easily passed; predictions for the 
temperature increases were noticeably smaller.  Specifically, the mean value of respondents’ best 
estimates drops from 3.4 degrees Fahrenheit for the year 2100 to 1.4 degrees Fahrenheit for 
2024.  On an individual basis the scope test results are very strong.  For the best estimate, 201 of 
the 255 respondents predicted a greater temperature increase till 2100 than 2024, while 250 of 
the 255 respondents assessed an increase at least as great for the longer term.  In terms of 
statistically significant coefficients that have the same sign in column 1 and column 2 of Table 2, 
the background paragraphs and heart attack variables are positive, while the U.S. citizen-
                                                 
22 That U.S. citizen was negative and significant suggests that any confusion between Fahrenheit and Celsius was 
probably not great.  U.S. citizens are the most used to Fahrenheit, which would lead to values 9/5 as high. 
23 The lower bound estimate had a greater coefficient, which is as expected if respondents believe, as would seem 
appropriate, that assessed distributions should be right skewed.  We repeated this study using logarithmic values for 
the best estimate of the temperature as well as the upper and lower bound.  This allowed for the possibility that 
variables were distributed geometrically about their median, implying that a value twice as high was equally likely 
as one half as high.  The results find that the upper bound estimate has a coefficient larger in magnitude than the 
lower bound.  This pattern indicates that the shape of the respondents’ estimated distributions are somewhere 
between arithmetic and geometric in shape. 
 11 
 
background paragraphs variable is negative.  The variables that are newly significant for 2024 
are Law student (5 percent level) and Earthquakes (10 percent level). 
 
Results for other consequences of global warming 
In Part 3, we shall turn to respondents’ willingness-to-pay for policies that ameliorate 
global warming.  These valuations will depend not only on the amount of temperature change 
expected, but also on the predicted consequences, such as changes in the economy, disease, 
storms, etc.  The survey included a series of questions that asked respondents which outcomes 
were likely to occur as a result of a five degree temperature increase by 2100.  The questions 
include three legitimate and widely discussed risks of climate change as well as one policy 
outcome—New England forest fires—that is not widely expected to be affected by climate 
change.
24  (New England rarely experiences significant forest fires.  Though scenarios where 
such fires become significant can be envisaged, this consequence has not been part of the 
climate-change discussion, much less media reports, unlike our other three consequences.  This 
suggests that respondents were conjecturing scenarios that might lead to the forest fires on their 
own.
25)  These four questions were intended to explore the extent to which respondents’ 
perceived consequences affect their willingness-to-pay for remedies.  They also tell how well 
respondents distinguish widely discussed possible outcomes from one that has received virtually 
no attention.   
The specific questions and responses appear in Table 3.  Four-fifths of the sample 
believed that there was more than a 50 percent chance that there would be a significant increase 
in hurricane activity.  In fact, the intensity of hurricanes is likely to increase, but not their 
number.  This was by far the most prominent risk outcome indicated among respondents and will 
be the main “consequence” variable examined in our analysis of willingness-to-pay.  There could 
have been a strong Availability Effect, since the survey was conducted just weeks after a period 
of unusually intense hurricane activity striking Florida, though before the massively disastrous 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma hurricanes of 2005.
26   
                                                 
24 Information on these four consequences came from geochemist and climate scientist Daniel Schrag, private 
communication, September 2004.  Forest fires was recommended as a plausible sounding but not likely risk. 
25 A referee alerted us that some forecasts on the effects of global warming include significant loss of maple 
sugarbush due to ice storms.  The resulting dead trees would increase the likelihood of summer forest fires. 
26 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for discussion of the availability effect. 12 
 
Two other risks discussed in the literature—widespread tropical diseases and a significant 
loss in world agricultural output—were each perceived as likely by half of the sample.  Perhaps 
reassuringly, the smallest percentage of the sample, 35 percent, believed that New England forest 
fires would increase significantly as a consequence of global warming.  Neither this variable nor 
the tropical disease and world agricultural output variables proved to be significant in any of the 
subsequent empirical analyses of attitudes toward global climate-change mitigation policies.  As 
a result, they are not reported even though they were in the specifications.  In contrast, the 
hurricane activity variable, the risk for which there was the greatest consensus in the sample, and 
probably also the greatest scientific consensus, proves strongly significant in some of these 
explorations. 
 
3.  Willingness to Pay for Climate-Change Mitigation Policies 
Do stronger beliefs that climate change is a serious risk translate into support for stronger 
policy interventions?  To answer this question, we assessed respondents’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) to curb global warming, i.e., the financial costs they were willing to incur in support of 
alternative policies.  We first focused on gas taxes as the payment mechanism.  Gas taxes are a 
familiar instrument: their rough current values are probably known to most respondents, they can 
be converted to annual incremental costs, and respondents perceive the use of gasoline as related 
to the risks of global warming.   
We did not want to ask respondents to estimate the effectiveness of a tax in curbing 
climate change, so we posited that our hypothetical gas taxes would be completely effective in 
addressing the risks of climate change, which is well beyond what actual gas taxes could 
achieve.   
The survey first ascertained what gas tax the respondent would favor if it would 
completely eliminate the risks of global climate change. Subsequently, respondents encountered 
a gas tax question that focused only on climate change risks that would occur until 2034.  At that 
time, the survey hypothesized, technologies would become available that could reverse any 
problems of climate change, and eliminate them for the future.  Thus, this would be an interim 
gas tax that would hold the effects of climate change at bay for the next 30 years.  In the earlier 
question, the gas tax would be permanent.  13 
 
Overall, the respondents were willing to pay fairly substantial gas taxes to address the 
risks of climate change. Existing taxes are in the 15-25 cent range for most states.  For the initial 
global warming question, where the tax would address risks through 2100, the mean willingness 
to pay was $0.79 per gallon.  For the policy that would curb climate change until the miraculous 
new technologies of 2034, the mean willingness to pay was $0.44 per gallon.  The respective 
medians for these two values were $0.50 (to 2100) and $0.10 (to 2034). 
The lower mean value for the less valuable gas tax—the one curbing climate change only 
till 2034 when new technologies come along—thus passes a scope test: in accord with rational 
decision, WTP is higher when more is accomplished.
27  Overall, 134 out of 255 respondents had 
a value for the 2100 question that was higher than for the 2034 question, and 238 out of 255 had 
a value greater than or equal to their 2034 value.  Logically, the longer-term gas tax WTP should 
secure a higher WTP even though it would also have to be paid for the longer period.  First, it 
would have to do the job in the absence of a miracle cure.  Second, presumably society would 
develop more fuel efficient cars over time, and also get richer, making a gas tax more affordable.  
We can not be confident, however, that respondents thought about all these issues.   
By any standard, the willingness-to-pay values are quite high relative to what we would 
expect citizens to pay on average for gas taxes to curb climate change.  First, the claimed 
efficacy of the gas tax is much higher in the survey than it would be in practice.  Second, the 
respondent group is substantially more affluent in discounted lifetime income than the typical 
American.
28  Third, the degree of environmental concern among our respondents is likely to be 
much greater than for the populace at large.  As a rough calculation, if these individuals drove 
10,000 miles per year and got 20 miles per gallon, they agreed to pay roughly $1500 per year for 
the long-term gas tax solution to climate change.  This value can be compared to the finding of 
Curry (2004, p. 48) for the general population.  He found that just over 50% of the population 
would pay as much as $10/month or $120/year on their electric bill “if it solved global 
warming.” These WTP estimates were highly variable.  The standard deviation of the WTP 
estimate for the gas tax till 2100 remedy was 72 cents.  What factors predict respondents’ 
disparate willingness to pay amounts? The logic underlying our predictions is that people 
predicting worse outcomes from global warming and having a more environmental focus will 
                                                 
27 Failure to meet such a test is often referred to as “embedding effects,” which are discussed by Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992). 14 
 
pay more, and that self-interest will influence WTP.  Further justifications for our predictions are 
discussed alongside the results. The predictions were:   
i.    Male.  Ambiguous coefficient. 
j.  Best estimate.  Positive coefficient. 
k.  Hurricanes.  Positive coefficient. 
l.  More aggressive.  Positive coefficient. 
m. Less aggressive.  Negative coefficient. 
n.  Use a car.  Negative coefficient. 
 
Results for willingness to pay 
Table 4 shows the results.  Males have lesser environmental concerns, indeed lower 
beliefs for most risks.  However, controlling for the level of risk beliefs males exhibit in higher 
willingness-to-pay than females in the gas tax to 2100 equation, they are willing to pay 30 cents 
more than women. This result may be due to gender differences in expected lifetime wealth.   
As expected, beliefs about the risk of global warming had a strong effect for both gas tax 
questions.  A three-degree increase in the assessed temperature increase pushed up WTP for gas 
taxes by 18 cents and 12 cents for the 2100 and 2034 scenarios, respectively.  The hurricane risk 
variable was also powerful, leading to 29 cent and 17 cent increases in WTP. Thus, we find that 
the percentage of respondents reporting a consequence is positively related to incremental 
willingness-to-pay for those who do report it. If a priori the consequences were felt to be equally 
serious, and if believes in them were equally strong by those who report them, this should not be. 
This suggests that frequency of belief may be correlated with strength of belief across these four 
consequences. 
A factor that may influence WTP, holding risk estimates constant, is whether a 
respondent feels scientific uncertainty motivates a more aggressive or less aggressive approach 
to climate change policy; this is addressed in the next section.  Environmentalists are 
overwhelmingly in the first camp, climate change skeptics in the second.  Given the 
accompanying political attitudes, we would expect to see a positive sign for those who would be 
more aggressive and negative for those who would be less aggressive.  All four coefficients went 
in the hypothesized direction; three were significant at the 0.10 level or better. 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 Our survey included foreign students, but they too will be wealthier than average Americans. 15 
 
These equations also included a variable for whether the respondent used a car and would 
therefore bear a gas tax directly.  Self-interest would predict a negative effect.  In fact, car users 
were willing to pay a higher tax in the year 2034 scenario.   A possible explanation is that car 
users are richer than other respondents, and expected to be richer in the future.
 29 
As a final test of the willingness to pay for reducing the risks of climate change, the 
survey asked what percentage of income the respondent would be willing to pay to avert the risks 
of climate change.  Unlike the gas tax questions, this formulation also included additional 
information regarding possible severe adverse consequences of global climate change.  Thus, the 
question format involved more than a simple difference in framing; it involved a difference in 
substance.  This survey question also does not include a well-defined payment mechanism, so 
that respondents may have treated the expenditures as being less real.   
Table 5 provides the distribution of these responses for the sample.  Of the respondents, 
81 percent were willing to contribute at least 0.1 percent or more of their income to address the 
risk of climate change, and 23 percent of the sample were willing to give up 5 percent or more of 
their income.  The median willingness to sacrifice was 3% of income.  The mean was 6%. If 
these individuals expect to earn $150,000 per year—a compromise between higher-earning law 
graduates and lower-earning Kennedy School graduates—they expressed a median willingness to 
give up roughly $4,500 per year, roughly three times what they said they would pay in a gas 
tax.
30  Two factors contribute to this five times disparity.  First, our income sacrifice question 
posited a 5 degree F. temperature change, and described the consequences of such a change, 
whereas 58% of our respondents thought that the change would be between 0 and 3 degrees.  
Hence, the question entailed a greater change in temperature. Second, offering more concrete 
consequences may have escalated payment amounts due to availability and accessibility effects.  
So too may have the fact that we asked about annual income, rather than say straight dollars.  
Due to what we label the percent thinking bias – people are willing to pay more absolutely when 
asked in relation to a greater quantity, e.g., annual income versus annual expenditures on 
gasoline – this may have led to larger WTP amounts.  The responses to the income sacrifice 
question had a much greater spread than those for the gas tax, perhaps because the current gas 
                                                 
29 We had no income or expected income variable.  Had we had an adequate control for income, the car coefficient 
might have been negative. 
30 It is unlikely that individuals’ gas tax answers were influenced by their percent of income answers, given the 
structure of this web-based survey. 16 
 
tax and its familiarity served as an anchor.
31   Finally, respondents may have answered the 




The Role of Scientific Uncertainty 
Finally, we examined respondents’ views on how scientific uncertainty affects the 
desirability of vigorous policies to curb climate change.  This issue has been at the center of 
policy debate.  Those who wish to “go slow” point to the level of scientific uncertainty; they 
propose that we wait to learn more, and possibly learn that the risk was greatly overstated.   
Those who favor aggressive action state that greater uncertainty, holding mean consequences 
fixed, should spur us to greater action.  Usually concerns about irreversibility and risk aversion 
on losses motivate this attitude.   
From a normative standpoint, the proper influence of scientific uncertainty on policies 
depends in part on the nature of the uncertainty.  If, for example, we were dealing with a simple 
lottery in which there is some probability p of an adverse outcome and a probability of 1 - p that 
there will be no adverse outcome, then the precision with which p is estimated should not be 
influential.  Indeed, greater concern about ambiguous probabilities, as opposed to precisely 
estimated probabilities, is known as ambiguity aversion, and is a well-documented form of 
irrationality that is inconsistent with Bayesian decision theory.
33   
In contrast, if there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the consequences, almost 
certainly the case with global warming, then additional considerations come into play.   
Conventional risk aversion by the citizenry would lead to more costly action if society were 
taking a one-time only measure to curb warming.  However, decisions to curb global warming 
                                                 
31 Indeed, the only statistically significant variable in a regression analysis that uses the same set of variables as in 
Table 4 was that those who believe that policies should be less aggressive in the face of scientific uncertainty also 
favored giving up less of their income.  None of the other variables were statistically significant.  The gas tax 
question had a mean of 0.79 and a standard deviation of 0.72, as compared to a mean of 6.2 and a standard deviation 
of 10.1 for the income percentage question.  
32 Daniel Kahneman’s (2002) Nobel Lecture reflects wisely on the behavioral concepts discussed here, including 
importantly the concept of framing, and provides references to the original literature.   
   
33 See Raiffa (1968).  The Ellsberg (1961) and Allais Paradoxes show that people have an aversion to uncertain 
probabilities, despite what decision theory prescribes.   The ambiguities with global warming entail an additional 
element, what has been called “ignorance” as opposed to risk and uncertainty (Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1990, p. 
561).   With risk probabilities are known, with uncertainty states of the world are known, but not their probabilities.  
With ignorance, as in global warming, even the states of the world are unknown.    17 
 
take place in a dynamic context, with decisions made in each time period as uncertainty unfolds.  
From a rational decision theoretic standpoint, the combination of the following two conditions is 
sufficient for scientific uncertainty to make greater aggressiveness desirable:  (1) Increasing costs 
of curbing greenhouse gas emissions within a period.  (2) The damage function from greenhouse 
gas emissions has positive first, second, and third derivatives.
34   Few if any respondents, we are 
confident, considered the mathematical properties of cost and damage functions when replying.    
Of the respondents, 51 percent believe that policy should be more aggressive in the face 
of uncertainty, 16 percent believe that it should be less aggressive, and 33 percent believe that 
there should be no effect on policy choice.  Not surprisingly, the role of uncertainty and its 
relationship to policy aggressiveness is correlated in a plausible manner with the distributions of 
outcomes that individuals predict. For example, respondents with lower values of lower bound 
temperature estimates are more likely to favor less aggressive policies, while respondents with 
higher upper bound estimates of temperature change are more likely to favor more aggressive 
policies.   Causality presumably runs in both directions:   right skewed distributions promote 
policy aggressiveness, and more aggressive attitudes lead respondents to produce right skewed 
distributions.
35    
 
4.  Behavioral Aspects of Attitudes toward Climate Change Policies 
Many of the themes that have emerged in the literature on behavioral versus rational 
aspects of individual choice, particularly those that relate to significant uncertainties, are echoed 
by our results for respondents’ risk beliefs concerning climate change, and their willingness to 
invest in climate change policies. Table 6 summarizes many of the key themes that emerged. 
We looked first at individuals’ general performance as risk assessors.  In important 
respects our respondents behaved according to rational prescriptions.  They passed scope tests, 
                                                 
34 Thus damage must increase faster than the quadratic, the borderline case with positive first and second derivatives 
but a zero third derivative.  With a quadratic function, adding a random component to the underlying variable does 
not change the expected derivative, i.e., the expected marginal cost.  In our context, this would mean that the 
expected marginal cost of emissions is not affected by temperature uncertainty.  If both conditions are on the border, 
e.g., quadratic case and constant costs for curbing emissions within a period, then uncertainty about consequences 
should not affect the aggressiveness of policies. 
35 Referee Jonathan Baron conjectured that aggressiveness would influence the upper-bound estimate more than the 
lower-bound one, which proves true.  In regressions not shown, the coefficient of 1.36 (degrees if “more 
aggressive”) was nearly four times as large as for the lower bound, and was significant at the 0.005 level, whereas 
the other coefficient was not.    Baron attributes this outcome to “belief overkill,” the tendency of individuals to 18 
 
and showed that they could assess distributions in a manner scientists would think reasonable; 
e.g., a big spread between upper and lower bounds, with estimates strongly skewed to the right.
36  
Their ability to think in terms of distributions is reassuring.  Just as a few decades’ practice has 
enabled ordinary people to think about the weather probabilistically – e.g., 70% chance of rain 
tomorrow – perhaps policy issues such as global warming, which are afflicted with massive 
uncertainties, should be talked about in terms of distributions of outcomes, at least to moderately 
sophisticated audiences.   
Important phenomena did emerge that suggest or show our respondents’ behavioral 
tendencies.  Their estimates of global warming risks correlated positively with their risk 
assessments for other hazards.  This finding indicates that there are systematic person-specific 
differences in assessments of risks, implying that biases in people’s risk beliefs in general are 
likely reflected in their beliefs about climate change.  Some individuals may be Pollyannas, 
others Chicken Littles, under- or over-estimating all risks.  Alternatively, the bias may be due to 
the tightness or breadth of distributions.
37  
The background paragraph information, which provided a general description of the 
source of climate change but no information on consequences and no numerical values, was 
expected to increase the accessibility of climate change as an issue.  As predicted, presenting the 
paragraph did increase respondents’ best estimates of the likely temperature increase.  This 
finding suggests that even fairly innocuous general information about climate change may call 
respondents’ attention to the policy importance of this issue.   
The second major component of our study was assessing willingness to pay to avoid 
climate risk.  The willingness of respondents to pay for policies to address the risks of climate 
change was quite substantial in our sample relative to values found for the general population, 
probably reflecting their greater affluence and stronger environmental concerns.  That would be 
perfectly rational. 
However, important behavioral propensities emerged in the related to willingness to pay 
arena as well.  Respondents who believed that Bush was likely to win the 2004 presidential 
election were less willing to contribute to higher gas taxes to combat climate change, which is 
                                                                                                                                                             
ignore arguments on the other side of controversial issues (Jervis, 1976, 128-142).   Belief overkill may well have 
affected many other responses to questions about climate change. 
36 See Zeckhauser, Shearer and Memishian (1975) for a discussion of the use of lognormal distributions in assessing 
environmental consequences.  19 
 
consistent with a combination of home team betting—you predict what you wish for—in 
conjunction with favoring the Bush administration’s policies toward climate change.  This 
suggests, more generally, that the general public may interpret the debate over the science 
associated with global warming through a political lens.  Or alternatively, that leaders with 
particular political views can convince their adherents of their own views on science.  In his 
famed essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” Milton  Friedman (1958) speculates 
that most policy debates could be resolved if we reached agreement about probabilities, even if 
values still diverged.  Even if he is right, reasonable societal consensus on global warming may 
still be far away.  Values differences may continue to drive differences in probabilities, that is, 
assessments of risk. Substantial differences in assessments of risks will make agreement difficult 
to reach.   
Anchoring effects may also be important in eliciting meaningful estimates of willingness 
to pay, as the percentage share of income questions elicited much higher and perhaps less 
credible estimates of willingness to pay than did the gas tax question.  Respondents may have 
anchored on current values for gas taxes. We conjecture the presence of percent thinking bias, 
namely that respondents tend to think of expenditures relative to some category, but pay 
inadequate attention to the relative sizes of the category.  For example, individuals might get 
more upset by a 10% increase in the price of milk than a 1% increase in the price of natural gas, 
even if the latter would cost them twice as much.  Thus, offering 3% of income (the median 
amount) might seem small, whereas offering to pay a gas tax of $0.79 (the median amount) 
might seem large if both were considered as part of their respective budgets of all spending, and 
automobile or transport spending.  
Finally, the magnitude of scientific uncertainty, which has played such a prominent role 
in the policy debate, influences respondents’ attitudes as well.  If the likely consequences of 
climate change become more uncertain, a slight majority of respondents believe that policies 
should be more aggressive, and they are also willing to pay more to eliminate climate change.  
Not surprisingly, the connection between values and policy predictions emerges here as well.  
Those predicting a Bush victory, whom motivated reasoning predicts are disproportionately Bush 
supporters, were significantly more likely to think that scientific uncertainty made a less 
aggressive policy appropriate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
37 Alpert and Raiffa (1982) show that most individuals assess distributions far too tightly. 20 
 
Our survey results show that respondents provide estimates and assess preferences that 
would disappoint ardent believers in either side of the rational versus behavioral debate.  Their 
responses reflect a blend of rational and behavioral decision. They avoid some of the classic 
behavioral traps, their estimates and willingness-to-pay amounts often respond in rational ways 
to important parameters in reasonable ways, and they are impressively able to provide 
probability distributions in their answers. But they also make choices that show significant 
behavioral tendencies:  anchoring, accessibility, and framing effects are prevalent, home team 
betting shows itself in both predictions and policy preferences, and percent thinking is revealed 
in willingness to pay estimates.  In the climate-change arena, behavioral decision tendencies are 
like a fun-house mirror: They magnify some estimates and shrink others, but the contours of 
rational decision remain recognizable.  21 
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Environmental Policy Survey - Version B 
 
This survey consists of a series of 17 questions dealing with your assessments of various risks, 
and your attitudes toward different environmental policies.  We recognize that you are not likely 
to be knowledgeable on these subjects.  Professor W. Kip Viscusi of Harvard Law School and 
Professor Richard J. Zeckhauser of the Kennedy School will analyze these survey results.  The 
results will be posted on our websites. 
 
Your individual responses will remain confidential.  However, if you provide us your name or 
email address you will be eligible to be one of four HLS students, chosen at random, each of 
whom will win a $50 gift certificate to the Harvest Restaurant for completing the survey.  
 
Your name or email address (optional; secures prize eligibility): _______________ 
 
OVERVIEW.  This survey deals with global climate change.  Harvard researchers describe the 
source of global warming in the following manner: “The world’s climate reflects, among other 
things, the concentration of greenhouse gases (including human-induced emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other pollutants) in the atmosphere.  Like in a greenhouse, these gases allow the 
sun’s heat to reach the planet surface but trap energy reflected from the surface resulting in 
warmer temperatures.  Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations increases the warming effect.” 
 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is the major international treaty addressing the control of greenhouse 
gases.  The Protocol has been ratified by all major nations save the United States and Australia.  
Final ratification in Russia is expected shortly.  The Clinton Administration, though signing the 
treaty, never brought it forward for ratification, and the Bush Administration announced that it 
would not do so.  The principal rationales for the U.S. position are that:  (1) the controls are ill 
conceived, and are too costly to the United States, and (2) that the developing nations, most 
importantly China and India, are not required to cut emissions.   
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
(All questions below about temperature employ degrees Fahrenheit as the measure.) 
1.  Global climate change has been at the forefront of many environmental debates.  Much of the 
reason for the controversy is that scientists have not reached a consensus regarding the likely 
extent of climate change.  The next 3 questions ask for your opinion regarding how much the 
temperature will rise, if at all, over the next century.  In particular, we will ask you to estimate in 
degrees Fahrenheit how much temperature will rise between now and 2100 in Boston. 
 
a.  Upper-bound estimate.  What is your upper-bound estimate of how much the temperature 
will rise?  Thus, you think that there is only one chance in 20 that the temperature increase could 
be more than this amount. Check one. 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 24 
 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
b.  Lower-bound estimate.  What is your lower-bound estimate of how much the temperature 
will rise?  Thus, you think that there is only one chance in 20 that the temperature increase could 
be more than this amount.  Check one. 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
c.  Best estimate.  What is your best estimate of how much the temperature will rise?  Thus, 
there is a 50-50 chance that the temperature increase could be above or below this amount.  
Check one. 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
2.  The effects of climate change will depend on where you live.  Canada and Russia will have 
longer growing seasons, while sea level rises, possible droughts, and changes in storm patterns 
may have adverse effects.  Do you believe the residents of Boston in the year 2100 will be better 
off or worse off because of the effect of climate change on our environment? 
Better off_____ 
Worse off_____ 
No significant change in well-being_____ 
 
3.  Now let’s think of the nearer term.  What is your best estimate of how much the temperature 
will rise over the next 20 years? 
Less than 1 degree_____ 
Between 1 degree and 3 degrees_____ 
Between 3 degrees and 7 degrees_____ 
Between 7 degrees and 11 degrees_____ 
Over 11 degrees_____ 
 
4.  The science of global warming is highly uncertain.  In 20 years time, for example, predicted 
outcomes for year 2100 could be significantly better than scientists predict given current 
knowledge, or they could be considerably worse.  Does this uncertainty make you think the 






5.  One policy that would help reduce emissions that lead to global warming would be a gas tax, 
whose effect would be to reduce motor vehicle use.  Would you favor paying a higher gas tax if 
doing so would eliminate the risk of climate change?  Check the highest amount of the tax below 
that you would be willing to pay per gallon of gas, assuming that all others paid it, to reduce the 







6.  Suppose that scientists are developing new technologies that would eliminate and reverse any 
problems of climate change, but that these technologies would not be on line until 2024.  So 
there may be some immediate consequences of climate change, but eventually the problems 
could be eliminated.  Thus emissions reductions would only reduce climate change effects for 
the next 30 years.  What is the highest amount of a tax per gallon of gas that you would be 







7.  Consider a hypothetical question.  Assume that the average temperature worldwide increased 
by 5 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100, how likely do you think each of the following outcomes would 
be for 2100? 
   Likely  Unlikely 
  (over 50% chance)  (below 50% chance) 
Significant increase in hurricane activity  _____  _____ 
 
Significant increase in New England forest fires  _____  _____ 
 
Tropical diseases noticeably more widespread  _____  _____ 
 




8.  Assume that the average temperature would increase by five (5) degrees Fahrenheit by 2100.  
Scientists project that among the effects of a five degree increase would be a two foot increase in 
sea level, and an intensification of weather.  Thus, thunderstorms would be much more severe 
and droughts more intense.  What percentage of your own current and future annual income 
would you be willing to give up, assuming that other citizens here and overseas did the same, to 





9.  Consider a group of 100 randomly chosen male Harvard students aged 24.  How many of 




10.  What is your best estimate of the number of U.S. citizens whom you believe will be killed in 




11.  What is your best estimate of the number of dwellings in the U.S. which will be destroyed 




12.  Who do you expect to win the next presidential election?  
Bush_____ Kerry_____ 
 































Upper Bound  Lower Bound  Best Estimate  Degrees Fahrenheit 
Temperature Increase by 
2100 
Percentage Distribution 
     
Less than 1  2 59  9 
     
1-3  20 33 49 
     
3-7  40 5  35 
     
7-11  33 2 5 
     
Over 11  5 1 1 
      
Mean estimate of 
temperature increase 
6.1 1.5  3.4 
      
Median estimate of 
temperature increase 








  Increase by 2100  Increase by 2024 
  Coefficient (Std. Error) 
    
Male  -0.841** -0.195 
  (0.295) (0.151) 
    
U.S. citizen  -0.592* -0.125 
  (0.345) (0.189) 
    
Law student  0.013 -0.309** 
  (0.303) (0.157) 
    
Bush predictor  -0.449* -0.046 
  (0.268) (0.150) 
    
Heart attacks  0.026** 0.014** 
  (0.009) (0.007) 
    
Earthquakes  1.4 E-5  2.1 E-5* 
  (9.5 E-6)  (1.2 E-5) 
    
Background paragraphs  1.764** 0.929** 
  (0.619) (0.362) 
    
U.S. citizen x Background 
paragraphs 
-1.573** -0.906** 
  (0.691) (0.404) 
    
R
2  0.17 0.17 
 
a All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted White standard errors.  All equations also include an intercept 
and Terrorism. 
* Statistical significance at the 90 percent level, two-tailed test. 




Global Warming Consequences Assessment 
 
Percent who Believe Risk Is Likely* 































  Gas Tax Remedy Till 2100 Gas Tax Interim Remedy 
Till 2034 New Technology 
  Coefficient (Std. Error) 
   
Male  0.305** 0.084 
  (0.084) (0.066) 
    
Best estimate  0.065** 0.042** 
  (0.022) (0.018) 
    
Hurricanes  0.292** 0.168** 
  (0.098) (0.056) 
    
More aggressive  0.121 0.214** 
  (0.100) (0.075) 
    
Less aggressive  -0.267** -0.128* 
  (0.112) (0.067) 
    
Use a car  -0.013 0.130** 
  (0.082) (0.065) 
    
R
2  0.21 0.18 
 
a All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-adjusted White standard errors.  All equations also include an intercept, 
U.S. citizen, Bush predictor, Law student, Heart attacks, Terrorism, Earthquakes, Tropical diseases, N.E. fires, 
Agricultural output, and Background paragraphs. 
* Statistical significance at the 90 percent level, two-tailed test. 
** Statistical significance at the 95 percent level, two-tailed test. 31 
 
Table 5 
Willingness to Sacrifice Income to Prevent All Global Warming 
 
Percentage of 















Mean  6% 






Summary of Rational and Behavioral Findings 
 
 
Results Consistent with Rational Behavior 
 
 
Think in terms of 
distributions. 
 
People are able to provide reasonable estimates of the 
distribution of likely temperature changes associated with 
global warming. 
 
Pass a Scope test.  Expectations of temperature changes till 2024 and 2100 
passed a scope test overall and on an individual basis. 
 
Identify likely risks.  There is evidence that people understand the more likely 
risks of climate change, such as hurricanes, as well as the less 
likely risks, such as New England forest fires. 
 
Pay more to avoid 
greater risks. 
Higher perceived temperature increases raise the expressed 










Neutral background information boosts risk beliefs, showing 
that the accessibility of the problem matters. 
 
Correlated estimates of 
independent risks. 
There is evidence for the correlated estimates hypothesis, 
people’s risk estimates are positively correlated across 
different risk domains. 
 
Home team betting.  People who predict a Bush election victory support Bush’s 
policies that are based on lower estimated risks. 
 
Percent thinking.  People pay more when asked in percentage terms of a larger 
quantity. 
 
 
 